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Fables for the Information Age: The Fisherman's Wishes
Abstract
The computer revolution is less a revolution in the usual sense of the word than the announcement of a
glamorous marriage between two powerful promises in the history of the modern West, the Enlightenment,
the impulse to encompass the entire world in a rational system of knowledge, and the Industrial Revolution,
the fruit of an ancient impulse to reduce the demands of nature to insignificance. By now we know that some
of the fondest legacies of the Enlightenment, such as the belief that the world is fully knowable and that
nothing more than rational knowledge is necessary to make us free, are ambiguous ones, but it is still difficult
for us to admit that the vision of the Industrial Revolution was naive. In many ways we still believe that utopia
is available to everyone who has the right equipment.
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The computer revolution is less a re-
volution in the usual sense of the word
than the announcement of a glamorous
marriage between two powerful pro-
mises in the history of the modern
West, the Enlightenment, the impulse
to encompass the entire world in a ra-
tional system of knowledge, and the
Industrial Revolution, the fruit of an
ancient impulse to reduce the demands
of nature to insignificance. By now we
know that some of the fondest legacies
of the Enlightenment, such as the
belief that the world is fully knowable
and that nothing more than rational
knowledge is necessary to make us
free, are ambiguous ones, but it is still
difficult for us to admit that the vision
of the Industrial Revolution was naive.
In many ways we still believe that
utopia is available to everyone who has
the right equipment.
Older by far than these two projects
to shape human existence is the quest
of the humanities to understand the
meaning of human dignity and iden-
tity. Their most distinguished efforts
have come from the desire to open hu-
man imagination to its highest possibil-
ities and greatest freedoms. The hu-
manist examination of values at the
core of human experience offers some
of the most searching standards by
which to measure the Midas-like claims
of the information revolution.
The marvelous capacities of new in-
formation technologies are not in
doubt. But virtuosity is not virtue. All
technologies that promise to make re-
calcitrant social problems yield to ap-
paratus are suspect. So advertised, they
have the greatest power to enter and
alter our lives in unanticipated ways.
Without any doubt, new information
technologies pose life-transforming
questions of access and control, price
and distribution, the changing organi-
zation of labor at home and abroad, al-
tered structures of banking and fi-
nance, what information will be hard-
est to come by, what information will
be most highly valued - and most im-
portant of all, who is to be put at risk
by the changes taking place, and how.
But there are things we are entitled
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to expect from an information revolu-
tion worthy of its name. A revolution
that deserves our sympathy usually in-
volves a shift of power from those who
have more than is just to those with less
than is necessary, accompanied by an
increase in the general happiness. But
the happy people in the imagery of this
revolution are already comfortable and
affluent. They are frequently bosses,
but there are grateful subordinates in
evidence as well - clerical workers,
salespersons, assembly line workers
and children. This is a paradoxically
orderly revolution, promising simul-
taneously to change everything and to
support and maintain the order we
know best. It is depicted always as a
bloodless revolution in which no one
will get hurt, and everyone will get
more stuff.
The information revolution has
other distinct public meanings as well.
It is advertised as a crowning achieve-
ment of Yankee ingenuity applied to
the enterprise of science. (Japanese suc-
cesses are often interpreted as an exam-
ple of the effective transfer of Western
psychology.) Since large numbers are a
well understood sign of power in our
culture, impressive quantities are used
to describe the recent growth of infor-
mation products and processes. This
year, for example, it is predicted that
the number of computers will outnum-
ber all the people on the planet. The
number of people who effectively
direct "all those computers does not
seem to concern us as much.
Another sense of the information re-
volution is economic. It is defined as a
shift of capital and labor from extrac-
tive and manufacturing industries to-
wards information products and ser-
vices, with a corresponding shift in
GNP. The dimensions of this shift are
controversial, since our criteria for
classifying and defining information
products and services are evolving
ones. Its significance is also debatable,
since it is not clear whether this is a true
shift in the motor of economic growth
or the evasive action of an economy in
trouble. And finally, the assumption
that information has not always been a
salient feature of economic activity is a
modern conceit. Though economists
do not yet have useful conceptual and
mathematical tools for disaggregating
it historically, information has always
been a significant factor in economic
activity. To conclude that information
is economically emergent only in Our
own age is something like writing the
history of newspapers by asking when
they first began to resemble the New
York Times.
Finally, there is a social sense of the
information revolution, in which it is
held that power is shifting to those who
command new kinds of information.
This is the most problematic claim of
all, since there is no single social order
emerging from the information revolu-
tion, but a series of competing orders
filtered through ideal images for popu-
lar consumption. Three of the most
viable orders are those of family, work
The new information
revolution creates a
friendly consumption
community populated by
members of the
nostalgically reconstituted
family of the post-war
SUburbs
and time.
In the iconography of the informa-
tion revolution, the family that buys a
home computer (much as earlier fami-
lies purchased the World Book Ency-
clopedia) plays the role of the nuclear
family, a favorite national character.
The family shattered by the generation
gap, teleVision, divorce, automobiles,
fast food and property' taxes, the fami-
ly once organized around familiar
arenas of consumption - a carport, a
home, a yard with a barbecue pit - the
family which is rarely ethnic or minor-
ity in custom or hue, has lately been re-
assembled around the home computer.
The video game removed from the
temptations of the video arcade to a
well-lighted domestic setting is the
hearth around which the nuclear fami-
ly blossoms into an extended family of
little kids, big kids, parents, grandpar-
ents, uncles and aunts. The new infor-
mation revolution creates a friendly
consumption community populated by
members of the nostalgically reconsti-
tuted family of the post-war suburbs.
A second narrative of order, this one
of work, depicts an executive whose ra-
diant smile tells us he is not afraid of
the. personal computer proudly dis-
played on his paperless desk. This exec-
utive may have to learn to type, but on
the model of a pilot in control of a vast
cockpit, not a secretary churning out
endless assignments for others. ("In-
side Every Investment Analyst Lives a
Daring Sub Commander," declares a
recent Radio Shack advertisement for
personal computers.) The white-collar
worker of popular convention rarely
moves real burdens against gravity or
through space. He or she manipulates
the magic levers of thought and influ-
ence. But. this executive surpasses all
white-collar competition shackled to
an earthbound realm of paper, which
may not be heavy to push but must be
physically sorted and tracked. With an
infinite electronic reach at his finger-
tips and the timeliest information from
the vastest data banks, he is lord of all
his computer surveys. He represents
the biggest target market for personal
computing, the largest growth segment
in the computer industry. His secre-
tary, on the other hand, a clerical
worker along with 20 percent of all
American workers, may find her job
phased out completely if he can be per-
suaded to compose text directly into a
word processor instead of writing out
his rough drafts by hand or dictating
them.
Th.e information revolution is also
portrayed as the harbinger of an ideal
future, or temporal order. History, the
old order,. is no longer something to en-
rich and teach us, but something to be
sloughed off, a disorder that perfect
technologies can repair. Computing
will rob history of its power over us by
halting the tragic consequences of ac-
cumulated past errors. If the perfect
technology can be put to work in time,
we will stop history in its tracks. Such
beliefs rest on the conviction (a puzz-
ling one, given the realities of everyday
experience) that the Industrial Revolu-
tion severed the inexorable chain of
fate, and that every subsequent tech-
nological development has been a fur-
ther unraveling of historical necessity.
To the endless argument about
whether technology enhances the social
order, is at war with it, ought to re-
place it, or is simply its instrument, this
ideal temporal order answers that
social orders will come and go as long
as we are ruled by history. Technology,
in this view, is not a narrative of order,
but a clear and distinct reality with the
power to enter history from without.
This argument is made on two contra-
dictory grounds. If history is an adver- '
sarial contest with nature, then by em-
bodying our creative ingenuity, tech-
nology has the power to temper nature
and finally to conquer it. On the other
hand, if history is mainly a narrative of
man's inhumanity to man, then tech-
nology, which answers only to the im-
partial authority of nature, can trans-
cend our quarrels and create a world of
plenty in which all conflict, having no
purpose, will vanish.
There is an unworkable paradox in
the presentation of technology both as
constrained by natural law alone and
entirely transparent to our wishes. Nor
is technology an autonomous agent of
change, as some current philosophical
fashions have it. It is never apart from
our history and our values, the things
~
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that define us as social beings. Like all
human creations, it is an expression of
social order and interest, inextricably
bound to circumstance and history.
_, Since order, interest, circumstance,
and history are also grounded in the
natural universe, technology partici-
pates in both the world of imagination
and the world of nature. It is above all
a special kind of power to make the
world of dreams real. Technologies are
embodied hopes, devices to implement
beliefs about how the world could be
made different. Technologies are social
dreams and fairy tales in action.
Our public fairy tales about compu-
ters are plentiful but shallow, perhaps
because they are very new. They tell us
the content of our wishes but do not
present the framework of wish-making
and the problems it presents. The vivid
plumage of current forms nevertheless
brings to mind one of the most instruc-
tive of traditional fairy tales, the tale of
three wishes. In return for giving aid to
a stranger who turns out to be an un-
recognized divinity or, alternatively,
some concealed potential in ourselves,
an ordinary human soul, sometimes a
fisherman, receives a boon of three
wishes. The consequences of the wishes
always surprise the wisher and always
outstrip his efforts to negotiate an ad-
vantageous bargain with destiny. Out-
done as often by his ignorance as by
vanity and greed, he often must use his
final wish to undo the unforeseen con-
sequences of earlier ones.
One of the lessons of this tale is that
we can bargain with fewer aspects of
destiny than we think. We are never
completely in control of the future. We
never truly recognize the stranger in
front of us, and our best impulses may
precipitate great tragedies. Like the
fisherman's imagination, our imagina-
tion is always limited, never omni-
scient. But technology, our wish come
true, is not limited in its effects by our
imagination. It is not only technology,
among our creations, that has this
peculiar relationship to its creators.
Likewise our language, our art and our
children, carefully nurtured projec-
tions of our imagination all, also are
not fully under our control, which fact
is a source of constant wonder as well
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as chagrin. In many of our most hope-
ful expectations for the information
revolution are fishermen's wishes of
this kind, fantasy solutions to difficult
problems incompletely considered.
Let us look at three of the most
widely held expectations for the com-
puter revolution:
1. The desire for options, for
choices, for self-determination and de-
liverance from coercion, the wish for
freedom to choose our own destinies, is
represented in the notion that compu-
ting technology, like every other tech-
nology, is neutral. It can only hurt us if
we look it in the eye and give it our per-
mission to do so. It can be put, with the
same facility, to entirely constructive
uses.
2. The desire for well-being, for the
guarantee of a safe and secure frame-
work within which to pursue the life we
cherish, is represented in the notion
that computers and computing skills
will diffuse automatically and demo-
cratically. The natural seductiveness of
computing in combination with the
free market will nourish political and
economic democracy.
3. Finally, the wish for pleasure, for
what gives us human delight, is repre-
sented in the notion that computers of-
fer novel possibilities for self-expres-
sion and development; in particular,
that the vastly expanded storage capa-
cities of computers offer inexhaustible
resources for liberating the human
spirit.
TeChnological
neutrality
Perhaps the most optimistic of these
is the wish that technology should be
neutral, that it should not take sides in
the human enterprise to the advantage
of some and not others, or worse, take
sides against humanity collectively.
Since technology may be used for good
or evil, and since it has been used for
both, the neutralists believe their case
is proved. In the information revolu-
tion we are continuously verging on, a
state which defers all consequential de-
cisions to the future and makes no one
responsible for anything so far, the
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choice seems to be entirely ours to re-
strict ourselves to good intentions
while avoiding serious mistakes. The
major flaw in this argument is not the
assumption that human nature is reli-
ably benevolent, but the assumption
that there is a breathing period in
which technology exists pure and un-
touched before human beings decide to
use it for good or evil. There is also the
assumption, already noted, that the
deleterious effects of any technology
can be foreseen and controlled, chosen
or rejected at will.
Technology is the imposition of an
order on nature by human beings for
the sake of some imagined useful pur-
pose. Even if technology cannot actu-
ally violate nature's order (at least not
permanently), its human design is a set
of choices, at every level an expression
of value. All technology is human-
made. If it's not human-made, it's not
technology; it's nature. Nor is nature
neutral to the human beings who live in
it.. It is beautiful, awesome, soothing,
difficult, helpful, dangerous by turns,
but it is never value free from the only
perspective available to us, our own. A
modern adversarial view of nature is
responsible for the kinds of technology
we have created to distance ourselves
from it. This nonneutral view of nature
as a foe to be manipulated, rather than
a powerful partner with whom to live
in cooperation, has been responsible
for a scale and quality of technological
development about which serious ques-
tions must be raised.
Every investment of social resources
in a particular technological order
changes the possibilities for realizing
alternative social and technological
orders. This can be said more bluntly.
Every attempt to serve the interests of
one group of people within the shelter-
ing framework of a particular techno-
logical arrangement limits and some-
times excludes possibilities for serving
the interests of other people, or for
serving different interests of the same
people. This selection process has spe-
cific consequences for real human be-
ings whose future choices (and whose
children's choices) will be constrained
by decisions made with or without full
appreciation of the chain of effects
that will follow from them.
Some proponents of the neutrality
argument claim, for example, that even
the bomb, that ominous symbol of our
age, is "neutral." Not until the button
is pushed will the bomb have conse-
quences that are, in the tradition of the
three wishes, truly 'unimaginable. But
the logic of consequence cannot be sus-
pended until this final terrible moment.
The consequences of the bomb are not
simply a latent potential as energy is la-
tent in a stone. Every decision to re-
search, develop, produce and maintain
bombs requires accompanying deci-
sions not to do other things. The very
lowest level commitment of material to
bomb building, instead of, say, to the
manufacture of efficient cooking and
heating stoves contributes to a particu-
lar configuration of society and of the
world itself. These are morally com-
plex and intricate configurations, but
they are not morally neutral and do not
randomly cancel one another out.
A student with whom I was discus-
sing this point once asked whether
there couldn't be some perfectly neu-
tral example of technology - whether,
for example, a hammer locked away in
a drawer and used by no one couldn't
be considered neutral. I don't think so.
A hammer represents a particular com-
mitment of natural and social re-
sources to its pJoduction and distribu-
tion among those who are thought to
be entitled to it. Hammers locked in
drawers also imply houses, which im-
ply additional orders of social wealth
/////
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Technology is the
imposition of an order on
nature by human beings
for the sake of some
imagined useful purpose
and organization, relationships of peo-
ple to nature itself, and so forth. They
imply, further, a society whose mem-
bers are able to buy tools which they do
not earn their living wielding, who buy
many things they do not need every
day. All these facts have a vast and spe-
cific social significance which can be
explored only with reference to con-
crete human lives and situations, but
which cannot be insignificant or neu-
tral. If a hammer is not as emotionally
compelling as a bomb, it is no less em-
bedded in and reflective of the society
that makes it, even as it lies inert in a
drawer much as a bomb lies in a silo.
In discussions of computers, the
wish for technological neutrality ap-
pears in the commandment against
anthropomorphizing them. Since com-
puters are machines with no conscious
intentions of any kind towards human
beings in the way that we understand
the term "conscious," the habit of
treating them as though there were lit-
tle men or women inside them respon-
sible for th.e frustrations or rewards
L:tey bring us i~ regarded as evidence of
fuzzy thinking and inappropriate psy-
chological projection. To harbor such
attitudes in a technological age is to be
embarrassingly ignorant of the score.
It is true enough that a computer is
not a person, But the plain facts are
that there isa little man sitting inside,
usually several little men, and more lit-
tle women all the time. The myth of
neutrality prevents us from under-
standing our experience of technology
in precisely human terms. In point of
fact, most of us will never transact
directly with computing machines,
whether those machines are "user-
friendly" minicomputers or number-
crunching mainframes. Only a few
highly trained engineers and computer
system architects will ever concern
themselves with the computer as brute
assemblage of chips and circuits. The
rest of us must approach the computer
as a logic system with many levels
and rules for creating, manipulating
and extending meaning. For most
users, successful computing is master-
ing some range of programs and pro-
gramming languages which are imagin-
ative structures created by other human
beings.
What it means to say that every com-
puter contains a homunculus is that
every computer program, system or
language represents. other human be-
ings with whom we are directly or indi-
rectly engaged in symbolic transactions
of mutual responsbility. In the end, a
computer program is nothing more
than a new-fangled, highly mediated
conversation among people in which
each participant has his or her own
part to play. If there is any error of
mystification, it is in imagining that
ordinary people are not entitled to raise
questions about computer operation
and accountability, since computers
are merely machines. When the com-
puter goes down at the bank, and you
are left standing in line with the excuse
that "the computer ... " followed by
various disclaimers of involvement on
the part of bank personnel, the neutral-
ity myth has been hoisted. A program
shot through with errors and inflexibil-
ity, a program that does not take ac-
count of real situations in which real
people will use it (the program at the
bank that does not anticipate peak de-
mand loads, for example), is a human
creation and a human responsibility, as
is the program that helps you do what
you want quickly and efficiently.
The commandment not to anthropo-
morphize computers, to respect their
mythical neutrality, transfers responsi-
bility from those who construct poor
programs and systems to nonexpert
users who are encouraged to blame
their own ignorance and anxiety for
any unfortunate machine-man encoun-
ters, since the least knowledgeable and
experienced users are most easily intim-
idated into believing they are not smart
or quick enough to play in the front
yard of technological culture. Those
who are the most sophisticated in the
use of this symbol system have the
greatest responsibility to develop and
share its potential benefits in a way
that includes as many people as possi-
ble.
Safety and security
The same technology that is de-
fended on some occasions as unim-
peachably neutral is trotted out on
others as the future foundation and
chief guarantor of a Way of Life. We
believe not only that utopia is available
to everyone with the right equipment,
but also that the information-age de-
scendants of the Industrial Revolution
will salvage the disappointed goals of
the Enlightenment. The second fisher-
man's wish is the hope that computing
technology contains, by nature, a
democratic logic of development. Once
(according to the rhetoric of the infor-
mation revolution) computer hardware
has diffused rapidly, widely and cheap-
ly, then as effect follows cause in a for-
tunate chain of necessary events, the
acquisition of computer skills by the
population at large will follow pain-
lessly. Since those who can most suc-
cessfully manipulate the symbol sys-
tems of their age are best fitted to gov-
ern themselves reflectively and self-crit-
ically, widespread computer literacy
will strengthen and enlarge the demo-
cratic character of daily experience.
The present order will prevail.
Although computers are flexible
enough to employ any symbol system
programmed into them, including
Egyptian hieroglyphics, alphanumeric
symbols are the basis of common dis-
course among most computer users,
and alphanumeric literacy is therefore
the single essential prerequisite for
computing skill. It is both a curious
and true fact that alphanumeric liter-
acy has never in all of history spread to
any large group of people automatical-
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ly. The effective diffusion of written
literacy to new groups of any size has
always required a very large effort by
some authority with both extensive re-
sources and large powers of compul-
sion - the state or the church.
In England, for example, the intro-
duction of writing as a routine admin-
istrative instrument of government
took two entire centuries, from the
11th to the 13th. Because of a series of
state initiatives that made written in-
struments mandatory for all legal prop-
erty claims in place of customary, age-
old oral instruments, literacy was grad-
ually extended from the king's court
down to the level of municipal author-
ity. But from the 13th until practically
the 19th century, further increases in
literacy were relatively modest; and
most citizens remained nonliterate
despite the invention in the 15th cen-
tury of a new and powerful informa-
tion technology, the printing press.
Not until the advent of 19th-century
compulsory education, representing
state leverage on a grand scale, did
mass alphanumeric literacy become a
reality.
Even in the 20th century, mass liter-
acy is pursued rather than achieved.
Several years ago a University of Texas
study suggested that perhaps 20 per-
cent of American adults are not func-
tionally literate. If we cannot create
mass literacy by seduction in a world
where the value and purpose of books
are well understood, a world where li-
teracy skills are familiar social furni-
ture, the belief that the natural fascina-
tion of computing will be an adequate
social stimulus to mass computer liter-
acy is fantasy.
The diffusion of computers and
computing skills depends on something
besides desire, something that is
neither democratically or automati-
cally distributed - and that is money.
A quarter will buy a video game, but
video skills are not the basis of power-
ful computer skills any more than po-
tato chips are the basis of good nutri-
tion.Put another way, video games are
to computer literacy as being able to
sign "X" in lieu of one's signature is to
the power of real alphanumeric literacy.
There is a distinct class bias associated
22/Sliptember 1982/Illinois Issues
with the levels of computing to which
people are likely to have access. Access
to the most powerful computers is
available to Big Business, Big Govern-
ment and Big Education. Access to
computers for job-related tasks exec-
uted by limited programs with little in-
tellectual flexibility or power are avail-
able to a wide range of workers from
airline reservationists to inventory con-
trol clerks. Video games are available
to poor people. Which child, the child
of the janitor or the child of the faculty
member, will be more likely to acquire
access to the computer of the university
for which both their parents work?
Personal computers are certainly less
expensive than large mainframes or
sophisticated microprocessors, but are
hardly within everyone's price range.
The newest model Apple II personal
computer fitted out with a modest but'
A qUarter will buy a video
game, but video skills are
not the basis of powerful
computer skills any more
than potato chips are the
basis of good nutrition
functional amount of software comes
for around $1,500 and is not within the
reach of poor families and many not-
so-poor families in this country,
though a national newsmagazine re-
cently spoke reassuringly of new gener-
ations of home computers priced at
under $1,000, "bringing them within
reach of schools, parents, or the chil-
dren themselves" ("Here Come the
Microkids," Time, May 3, 1982, p.
51). This estimation of a ceiling of ac-
cessibility suggests a notion of the re-
sources and opportunities of most chil-
dren that makes the breath come hard.
This is not democracy. This is a way to
widen information gaps and keep peo-
ple out of the information chain. The
same economic and historical factors
that make some persons more likely to
receive excellent training in alphanu-
meric literacy, and others less likely to,
are exaggerated when it comes to com-
puter literacy. Skilled teachers of com-
puter literacy are far rarer than skilled
teachers of print literacy, and compu-
ter systems of any power cost far more
than books full of powerful ideas. The
largest national manufacturer of per-
sonal computers, Apple Inc., recently
announced its intention to donate a
tax-deductible minicomputer to every
school in the United States. While the
spirit of this plan may be laudable,
logistically speaking, it is only some-
what more visionary than giving every
school a single pencil for teaching writ-
ten literacy.
The consequences of electronically
created information gaps and mono-
polies are more serious still when we
extend our concern to a world commu-
nity. If it will be difficult to propel
many of our own citizens into the com-
puting mainstream, what can we say
for the information age prospects of
poor countries with large nonliterate
~ populations? The computer informa-
tion and communications networks
which successfully serve industrialized
economies pose terrifically difficult ob-
stacles for countries already struggling
to live with our technological preco-
ciousness. Nations knit by traditional
oral systems of communication seem
backward only in a world that mea-
sures power by the speed with which
information moves and the extent of its
reach. The political, economic and so-
cial disequilibrium in which these
countries are placed by their simultan-
eous desires to compete with high-tech-
nology societies and to serve the basic
needs of their populations is neverthe-
less real. Since the introduction of
most technology is lumpy, it could be
argued that eventually this balance will
be redressed. What history suggests is
that the balance will not be redressed
automatically, as our fisherman's wish
has it, and that for some groups redress
will come too late or not at all.
For it remains to be proved that
technological advance raises every-
one's standard of living S00ner or
later. The social and economic cost to
poot countries of Western technologi-
cal development since the Industrial
Revolution has never been seriously
calculated. Over several centuries we
have significantly raised the standard
of living in the West, but the long-term
effect on other parts of the world and
our own future is not so clear. A num-
ber of cultures have been destroyed or
irreparably damaged by our technolo-
gical development. Others have shoul-
dered massive economic dependencies.
Today, for example, large numbers
. of young Asian women work in high
health-risk conditions at very low
wages to assemble the integrated chips
and circuits for which the West is so
eager. For pocket change and the tin-
foil excitement of a few years of urban
living, some of them are jeopardizing
their eyesight, and others are jeopardi-
zing what social status they may have
had in the traditional societies from
which they come. They cannot easily
return to the old society, where "fac-
tory girls" are often unmarriageable,
their tenure in their present jobs is
short, and their health may make them
unemployable in other jobs. It is hard
to believe that the diffusion of "pro-
gress" will compensate for the person-
al and cultural pain this work will mean
for many of them. In this case, the bur-
den of change falls heavily on the most
defenseless.
The conventional belief that the in-
vention of new modes and skills of
communication is an unmixed blessing
for the world finds little historical sup-
port. In this respect not even literacy
has a thoroughly honorable history. In
the half a millennium since the inven-
tion of printing, both printing and lit-
eracy have been used against cultures
without these tools. With the indispen-
sable assistance of maps and written
orders, for example, large military and
expeditionary forces were deployed
from the Old World to the New by
Europeap invaders, and global trade
was more easily organized to the strate-
gic advantage of the West. Europeans
denied Indian claims to their own na-
tive lands with the specious legal ra-
tionale (credible only perhaps to the
nouveaux literati cultures of Western
Europe) that the Indians lacked appro-
priate written proofs of ownership. On
occasion Europeans, and later their
American descendants, took steps to
perpetuate the illiteracy of slave popu-
lations. New information technologies
have always challenged old hierarchies
of privileged and popular knowledge,
but they have also introduced new and
unequal hierarchies of privileged and
popular knowledge as well.
One telling example comes from the
history of telegraphy, the very first of
the electric information technologies of
which computing is the latest example.
To many observers in the mid-19th
century, the telegraph seemed quite as
revolutionary as the computer seems to
us. Jacksonian democrats of this per-
iod hailed it as a technology with a
built-in logic decentralization and ex-
pected it to put an end to monopolies
of information that distorted political
and economic democracy. Information
that could traverse continental dis-
tances instantly seemed less vulnerable
to manipulation by the industrial East
against the hinterlands.
Ironically, the telegraph for which so
much had been hoped became some-
thing quite unexpected: the first na-
tionwide industrial monopoly in the
United States ..
In a frequently repeated pattern,
some early telegraph companies joined
with regional railroad monopolies in
arrangements that made them the ex-
clusive carriers of all telegraph mes-
sages received and transmitted by the
contracting railroads. In return, these
railroads were accorded preferential
telegraph rates and treatment. In the
bitter competition of this period
among scores of small telegraph com-
panies, those with railroad alliances
fared best and often merged into re-
gional telegraph monopolies. Not long
after the Civil War these regional sys-
tems had coalesced into virtually a sin-
gle monopoly system of commercial
telegraphy under Western Union. Be-
fore the end of the century most news-
wire traffic also belonged to a single
company, the New York Associated
Press, which also had exclusive West-
ern Union contracts. The first electric
information technology erected new
forms of centralization and monopoly,
and became a prototype for modern
big business.
Computing
for pleasure
The last of our fisherman's wishes is
that computers should offer new op-
portunities for creative pleasure.
Though we seem to wish for more play
in our lives, play has no ritually
honored or justified place in our socie-
ty. It is what can begin only after all
the work is done. And the work is
never done. When new information
technologies shorten the time or
decrease the capacity needed to ac-
complish a given task, we increase the
number of tasks for which we are
responsible and extend the range of
their operation, so that additional time
and space that might have been given
to playful expression is once again
dedicated to productive necessity.
The more communications capacity
we create, the more opportunity for
purely imaginative communication
there could be. The rhetoric of product-
ivity that dominates our lives subor-
dinates all play to the major task of
managing the world's more and more
tightly wound economic machinery, in-
stead of as a social function of the
greatest importance. Play explores
what is unexpected and surprising. It
lays the groundwork for noncoercive
social and personal change. Certainly
play has a ritualistic and socially con-
servative character as well. But genuine
playfulness stretches imagination by
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releasing it from bondage to one task.
By encouraging the shock and delight
of the unanticipated, it promotes
transformation. Its dynamic agent is
not social compulsion, but the fascina-
tion of previously undiscovered pos-
sibilities. Play is a genuinely con-
structive instrument of social change.
The more constrained and specialized
our social roles, the more important is
the existence of a playful experimental
margin within which more fragile and
tentative aspects of personal and social
development can flourish. Play can
also offer us imaginative worlds to
cultivate that do not require the pro-
duction and consumption of more and
more goods for their maintenance. In a
world of dangerously diminishing re-
sources, the cultivation of creative
playfulness as an alternative to the in-
satiable overconsumption of so many
industrialized societies may be crucial.
New technologies
create conditions for
new power struggles;
they are the manifest
imperfection as well as the
marvel of our morality
and imagination . ..
With the emergence of new informa-
tion technologies of greatly increased
capacity and interactivity, scarcities of
the means and resources for com-
municating are sometimes described as
a thing of the past. The notion that
new technologies will absorb the
overflow of utilitarian message-making
and offer a wealth of extra channels
for imaginative play and development
is'not a new one. All the civilizations to
which writing and printing came
learned to swallow the increased
volume of messages those technologies
made possible and to demand more.
The scarcity of channels with which to
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communicate has always depended
more on social, political and economic
priorities, arrangements governed by
human values all, than on simple
technological virtuosity.
Technologies like computing do not,
no matter how much we wish them to,
release us from the eternal human
obligation to make responsible value
choices. Something more than appa-
ratus will always be required to free us
from the shortcomings of our own
morality and imagination. New tech-
nologies create conditions for new
power struggles, they are the manifest
imperfection as well as the marvel of
our morality and imagination, they use
scarce resources which are then un-
available for other purposes. And this
will always be so.
Many of the most disturbing conse-
quences of the information revolution
are taking place out of the spotlight
where it is hard for us to see them, in
the margins of our own and other
societies, among the poor, among
Third World populations, among
women and the elderly, in the environ-
ment itself, among many groups whose
connection to centers of power is very
tenuous. Because it is always difficult
to see effects at the margins, it is even
more difficult to understand the con-
nections from these effects to the
choices for which we are answerable.
Many people can be damaged before
those with the power and the concern
to change such conditions, certainly all
of us with a generous share of the
creature comforts of our age, take
notice. Technology, information tech-
nology especially, should not give us
the power not to notice that others are
in trouble.
New information technologies will
be used by the powerful to increase
their power unless somebody makes
other plans. And just as freedom,
security and pleasure have never been
easily won in the history of the world,
just as that battle is never fully won
and must be continually refought, so it
is not going to be easy now. But it is
going to be important. 0
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